Justice Ramirez, the serial legislator strikes again.

sandpit

In a case of I have a bigger shovel to whack you over the head with than you, Justice Ramirez again failed to apply his duties as presiding justice of the fourth district court, preferring to engage in a tit for tat game with a litigant to display that HE has the ultimate power.

There is no law involved in these actions as Justice Ramirez is legislating from the bench. Instead there is a fixated kindergarten mentality to teach somebody that they belong to a different class of litigants that do not deserve equal protection under the law, in retaliation for lodging a complaint against his actions.

In the previous saga Justice Ramirez denied a writ petition citing the abusive actions of the other parent in an appeal that is still pending before the court. https://viewsandnewsriversidesuperiourcourt.wordpress.com/2014/03/20/4th-district-division-two-discriminates-against-litigants-fails-to-protect/ .  In his epistle Justice Ramirez cited that an appeal would suffice.

In a contradictory move Justice Ramirez, on his lonesome denied the appeal, legislating from the bench as none of his actions are reflected in ANY title eight proceeding.

08/08/2013 Notice of appeal lodged/received.     Dtd Aug 1, 2013;xxxxxx
08/08/2013 To court.     Notice of appeal & file folder.
08/12/2013 To presiding justice for signature.     Proposed order
08/13/2013 Notice re vexatious litigant (CCP 391.7) – Matter stayed.     Applnt to serve/file w/in 10 days, a rqst for permission to file appeal. Applnt is additionally directed to serve/file w/in 10 days a correctly completed CCIS which attaches copy of judgment/order being appealed. Failure to comply will result in dismissal of appeal.
08/15/2013 Vexatious litigant application filed (initial case event)
08/15/2013 Received:     Civil case info statement
08/15/2013 To court.     Application for appeal & CCIS.
04/02/2014 Vexatious litigant application denied
04/02/2014 Case complete.

A gander into the vexatious litigant legislature specifies that an appeal is not referenced in any capacity, nor is an application for an appeal referenced; nor is a requirement to file a civil case information statement referenced as part of the vexatious litigant statute. Indeed the term notice of appeal does not reveal itself.

However, Justice Ramirez has initiated an informal policy not codified in any title eight rule forcing litigants to demonstrate the merit of an appeal before the appellate record has been filed, which of course is decided on his subjective capricious whim, displaying considerable discrimination to a certain class of litigants who do not deserve the equal protection standard under the law.

There are no stay provisions defined in the CCP § 391 statute for an appeal where the term stay is not referenced in any capacity. Instead California rules of court 1.20a specifically states: “Unless otherwise provided, a document is deemed filed on the date it is received by the court clerk”. By definition it does not matter if the court files it; the filing date is DEEMED when the court clerk receives it. The Supreme Court has already struck down the invidious discrimination displayed by a court of appeal and a district court who engages in discrimination in the case of In Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327, 89 S.Ct. 1715, 23 L.Ed.2d 340 (1969), where the Supreme Court struck down a procedure where the petitioners seeking to reinstate an appeal were required to state what issues would be raised on appeal and to show that the previous denial of the appeal had been prejudicial to them.

A similar concept regarding stay provisions was addressed in a published opinion of a writ of supersedeas, which specified the following: “Special proceedings are subject to the stay provisions of Part 2 ONLY if the statute creating the special proceeding expressly incorporates them.”The court held that the order was not automatically stayed because the proceeding wasn’t really an “action” for purposes of the rules governing stays and undertakings on appeal in a civil “action.” (Code Civ. Proc. secs. 22-23.) In fact, the parties agreed that the involuntary dissolution suit was a “special proceeding” under Code of Civil Procedure section 23. Since the stay provisions (Code of Civil Procedure sections 916 et seq.) of Part 2 of the Code apply only in civil actions, the decree was not automatically stayed; Veyna v. Orange County Nursery, Inc., case no. G041305 (4th Dist. Jan. 15, 2009). The same concept applies to the stay system that the appeal court has creatively implemented with anyone that has been declared vexatious. First of all by implementing a stay the court of appeal recognizes the automatic stay provision of CCP section 916. More importantly the vexatious litigant statute quite categorically does not provide for a stay mechanism of an appeal, suggesting a fundamental violation of due process and equal protection of the law under the fourteenth amendment

Advertisements

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s