These are the types of the cases that our Fourth District Division Two appellate court in Riverside has allocated a preferential status to and considers of paramount importance as that notice of appeal was filed in February 2013. It is of course more important to consider a $ 500 attorney fee cost issue, (see case below), where there are no issues concerning the health and welfare and prolongued torture of children, than any current pending custody cases in this court, some of which have been pending for over TWO AND A HALF YEARS; with a notice of appeal filed in September of 2011.
Quite simply parents and their children in this court do not matter in any capacity as a $ 500 attorney fee cost issue is DEEMED crucial and relevant. Our constitution in this country guarantees that the relationship between parents and their children is accorded a protected preferential status. The fourteenth amendment substantive due process right to a protected familial parent child relationship was already recognized in IDK, Inc. v. County of Clark, 836 F.2d 1185, 1192 (9th Cir. Nev. 1988) and Carey v.Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 684-685 (1977), where the United States Supreme Court repeatedly teaches that there is “a right of personal privacy” which includes “family relationships,” and child rearing and education.
I am sure taxpayers, including parents who fund our current court system, are delighted that our children are valued at less than $ 500 in appellate court terms.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Plaintiff and Respondent,
JANAI KIRA HASAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Jules E. Fleuret,
Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part with directions.
Jeanine G. Strong, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General,
William M. Wood and Meagan J. Beale, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Defendant and appellant Janai Kira Hasan was charged with five counts of assault
with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)).1 The trial court later granted
defendant’s motion under section 1118.1 to dismiss two of the five counts.
A jury found defendant guilty of three counts of simple misdemeanor assault
(§ 240), as a lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon. Defendant was
sentenced to three consecutive six-month sentences in county jail with credit of 554 days
for time served. The trial court also ordered defendant to pay $500 in attorney fees in
addition to other fines and fees.
Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in ordering him
to pay attorney fees without notice and a hearing to determine whether he had the present
ability to pay the fees as required by section 987.8. The People concede the error. We
agree with the parties, and will remand the matter to the trial court to conduct a hearing
on defendant’s ability to pay.
There is no dispute defendant was provided legal assistance in the instant case at
the county’s expense. Under the terms of the statute, the trial court may, but only after
notice and hearing, order a defendant to pay all or a portion of the costs of his legal
representation if the court determines the defendant has the “present ability . . . to pay”
such costs. (§ 987.8, subd. (b).)
A determination that a defendant has the ability to pay is a prerequisite for entry of
an attorney fee order. (§ 987.8, subd. (e).) While such a determination may be implied,
the order cannot be upheld on review unless it is supported by substantial evidence.
(People v. Nilsen (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 344, 347.) When the issue on appeal is
sufficiency of the evidence, “we must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
judgment.” (People v. Mercer (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)
Defendant first argues he was not provided notice of a hearing on the issue of his
present ability to reimburse the county for all or a portion of the costs of his legal
representation. There is no probation report in the instant case, and at the sentencing
hearing defendant asserted that he was unable to pay the attorney fees. The record is
devoid of any indication that defendant was provided the notice required by statute.
2 The details of defendant’s criminal conduct are not relevant to the limited issue
raised in this appeal. Those details are set out in defendant’s brief, and we will not
recount them here. Instead, we will recount only those facts and procedural background
that are pertinent to the issue we must resolve in this appeal.
Defendant also argues there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
implied finding that defendant had the ability to reimburse the county for costs of legal
representation in the amount of $500. Section 987.8 defines “‘[a]bility to pay’” as a
defendant’s “overall” financial capability to pay, and lists factors relevant to this
determination. (§ 987.8, subd. (g)(2).) Those factors include “[t]he defendant’s present
financial position” (§ 987.8, subd. (g)(2)(A)); “[t]he likelihood that the defendant shall be
able to obtain employment within a six-month period from the date of the hearing”
(§ 987.8, subd. (g)(2)(C)); and his or her “reasonably discernible future financial
position” (§ 987.8, subd. (g)(2)(B)). In determining the last of these factors, “In no
event shall the court consider a period of more than six months from the date of the
hearing . . . .” (Ibid.)
Drawing all inferences in favor of the judgment, we agree with the parties that the
record here does not contain sufficient evidence of defendant’s ability to pay attorney
fees. There is no evidence of defendant’s “present financial position” in the record. We
will, therefore, reverse the trial court’s order for reimbursement of attorney fees and
remand the matter for a hearing on defendant’s ability to pay.
The judgment of conviction is affirmed. The trial court’s order for reimbursement
of attorney fees is reversed. The matter is remanded for the trial court to conduct a
hearing on defendant’s ability to pay these fees should the People continue to pursue
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS