This is what the Court docket reads in case IND xxxxxx Riverside Superior Court. Pinocchio’s nose has just grown and crossed another continent with the absolute fictitious nature of that statement.
The court is expressing the alleged belief that it is acting in compliance as a result of Justice Ramirez denying a perfectly valid writ proceeding, quite clearly displaying that there is a conspiracy under the color of law to prevent that a litigant is accorded the fourteenth amendment right to due process and equal protection under the law. https://viewsandnewsriversidesuperiourcourt.wordpress.com/2014/06/06/another-day-in-paradise-in-the-fourth-district-court-of-appeal-division-two-court-justice-ramirez-denies-writ-petition-on-an-improper-merit-standard/ In this case a judicial officer deemed a litigant vexatious in ONE family law cases citing declarations and papers and order to show causes and the Superior Court prohibits the filing of any and all pleadings in said family law case. The Superior Court and the Court of appeal are desperate to uphold the illegal nature of this alleged “order”, conspiring with each other to demonstrate an alleged non existent compliance.
Indeed this Superior court and the Court of Appeal are not acting in compliance with the Supreme Court holding expressed in a recent California supreme court case which analyzed the relevant statute.
The CA supreme court, in a written opinion drafted by our Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye, in Shalant v. Girardi, (2011) 253 P. 3d 266 commented on applying the vexatious litigant statute as a whole to individual motions, pleadings filed in one lawsuit and that legislative intent of the statue is to apply the vexatious litigant statute to unmeritorious new “actions” or “lawsuits, not motions or pleadings in one lawsuit.
“Reading the vexatious litigant statutes as a collective whole, defendants’ construction is not a plausible one. If “litigation” as defined in section 391, subdivision (a) included every motion or other procedural step taken during an action or special proceeding, and that definition were applied throughout the vexatious litigant statutes, several provisions would take on absurd, unworkable, or clearly unintended meanings. Under section 391, subdivision (b)(1), a person could be declared a vexatious litigant for losing five motions—all of which might have been filed in the same lawsuit—in a seven-year period. Section 391, subdivision (b)(3)’s reference to “motions, pleadings, or other papers” filed in the course of a litigation would make little sense if every motion, pleading, or paper filed was itself a new litigation. Under CCP § 391.1, the defendant could move for an order requiring the plaintiff to post security each time the plaintiff filed a motion or took any other procedural step. The trial court would then have to hold a hearing—separate from any hearing on the motion itself—and determine whether the plaintiff was reasonably likely to prevail on the motion or other procedural step. (CCP § 391.2.) On a negative finding, the court would then be required to order the plaintiff to furnish security, presumably cumulative to any ordered at earlier stages of the action. (CCP § 391.3.) If the plaintiff failed to provide the security, the action would, according to section 391.4, be “dismissed,” though the negative ruling on a motion is ordinarily referred to as a “denial” rather than a “dismissal.”
Under CCP § 391.7 itself, defendants’ construction of “litigation” would be unworkable. A vexatious litigant in Shalant’s position, having filed the action through counsel but then having lost representation, would be required to seek permission of the presiding judge before filing any motion or other paper. The presiding judge of the court would thus be placed in the position of overseeing each procedural step of an action pending in another department and deciding in each instance whether the particular motion, pleading, or paper had “merit.” (§ 391.7, subd. (b).) If the clerk inadvertently filed any motion or other paper from the plaintiff, a notice from any other party that the plaintiff was subject to a prefiling order would automatically stay the “litigation” (§ 391.7, subd. (c))—that is, the particular motion filed or other procedural step taken—but the rest of the action would not necessarily be stayed at the same time. Pretrial and trial proceedings would be constantly interrupted for trips to the presiding judge’s department; an orderly and efficient trial would be impossible. Again, the statute provides that if permission is not granted, an inadvertently filed litigation is to be “dismissed” (ib id.), indicating the drafters did not intend each motion, which would ordinarily be granted or denied, but not “dismissed,” to be considered a separate “litigation.”
(11) Section 391.7, then, is not reasonably susceptible to a reading under which a prefiling order would bar the vexatious litigant from filing motions or other papers in propria persona even when the action (or special proceeding (see CCP §§ 22, 23)) was itself properly filed through counsel. Any ambiguity on this point, moreover, would be dispelled by examination of the legislative history behind section 391.7′s enactment, which shows a clear focus on precluding vexatious litigants from filing in propria persona unmeritorious new “actions” or “lawsuits.”
Technically assuming that the legal construction of the VLS statute holds as outlined in the Shalant court, the VLS statute cannot be applied to family law cases as a person would have to be married and divorced 5 times in seven years to qualify as a vexatious litigant pursuant to CCP § 391 (a). California has a mandatory six months waiting period before a dissolution judgment can be granted once a divorce petition has been served therefore it is a legal impossibility to remarry and divorce 5 times in seven years. “CA family code § 3 2339. (a) Subject to subdivision (b) and to Sections 2340 to 2344, inclusive, no judgment of dissolution is final for the purpose of terminating the marriage relationship of the parties until six months have expired from the date of service of a copy of summons and petition or the date of appearance of the respondent, whichever occurs first”.