Disqualification sought of Chief Justice due to conflict of interest of petition for review that addresses the vexatious litigant statue in California.

To the Honorable Chief Justice of the State of California and to the Honorable Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of California.

Petitioner, xxxxxx, hereby petitions this court to reinstate the Petition for Review for good cause as the Chief Justice of this Court is a defendant and appellant in a class action case currently pending in the Ninth Circuit of Appeal, that addresses all similarly situated litigants in the State of California, (see exhibit 1). The Chief Justice represents the Judicial Council of the State of California in that case which has unlawfully allowed the propagation of the family law vexatious statute in family law cases, although the legislative intent of the statute specifies that the vexatious litigant statute CANNOT be applied in family law cases.

Petitioner was unlawfully declared a vexatious litigant in the Riverside Superior Court in ONE family law case. Case 13-17170 Ronald Pierce et al vs Tani Cantil-Sakauye is still pending in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal as such the Chief Justice of this Supreme Court has a conflict of interest deciding any issues relating to any vexatious finding or application in the State of California.

The Chief Justice of this Supreme Court has also drafted the opinion in Shalant v. Girardi, (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1164 253 P. 3d 266, which specifies that the vexatious litigant statute cannot be applied to individual motions or pleadings in ONE case, precisely the scenario that occurred in appellant’s family law case. Family Law is considered to be civil law in the State of California and the court cannot apply a different standard in considering issues of public relevance in family law proceedings than all other cases which it has accepted for review.

The Federal Disqualification Standard pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 (a) mandates that any justice, judge or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. There is no question that an objective observer would reasonably question the impartiality and bias of Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye in this case and question whether the chief justice as a defendant in a lawsuit involving all similarly situated family law vexatious litigants has personal knowledge of evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 (b)(1).

In addition as a defendant to a case involving all similarly situated family law vexatious litigants the chief justice is also a material witness to proceedings (28 U.S.C. § 455 b(5)(iv) and has an interest that could be substantially affected by these proceedings, (28 U.S.C. § 455 b(5) (iii))


Section 455(a) requires disqualification for the appearance of partiality (i.e., when a judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned”).Section 455 also requires disqualification if a reasonable person might believe that the judge was aware of circumstances creating an appearance of partiality, even if the judge was in fact unaware. In Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.,486 U.S. 847 (1988). the trial judge was a member of the board of trustees of a university that had a financial interest in litigation before the judge, but he stated that he was unaware of the financial interest when he conducted a bench trial and ruled in the case. The court of appeals, nevertheless, vacated the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) because the judge failed to disqualify himself pursuant to § 455(a), and the Supreme Court agreed. Noting that the purpose of § 455(a) is to promote public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process, the Court observed that such confidence “does not depend upon whether or not the judge actually knew of facts creating an appearance of impropriety, so long as the public might reasonably believe that he or she knew.”

Courts of appeals have likewise required disqualification when a reasonable observer might think that judges were aware of events or information that could impair their impartiality—even if they were not so-aware. The Seventh Circuit, for example, remanded a habeas case directing the judge to whom the case had been reassigned to provide the petitioner the opportunity to challenge the dismissal of four claims by the previously assigned district judge, Russell v. Lane, 890 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1989). See also E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1295 n.7 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating district judge’s lack of actual knowledge of his former firm’s involvement in the litigation is irrelevant). That judge had ruled on the habeas petition without realizing that he, as a state court judge years earlier, had been on the panel whose decision was now challenged.

In United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1987) the Eleventh Circuit held that the trial judge should have disqualified himself from a lawsuit against Alabama and its state universities where the judge had been a state legislator involved in legislative battles germane to the litigation. The judge was “forced to make factual findings about events in which he was an active participant.” In this case the Chief Justice of this Supreme Court is also the Chief Justice of the Judicial Council of the State of California which has initiated a policy of instituting an unlawful vexatious application in family law cases in this State, not defined in the vexatious litigant statute, and is a defendant in a lawsuit seeking to declare the vexatious litigant statute unconstitutional in family law proceedings in this state.


Speaking generally, any acts which exceed the defined power of a court in any instance, whether that power be defined by constitutional provision, express statutory declaration, or rules developed by the courts and followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, are in excess of jurisdiction, in so far as that term is used to indicate that those acts may be restrained by prohibition or annulled on certiorari, In Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, (1941) 17 Cal. 2D 280.

In a Supreme Court opinion, Rodman v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.2d 262 [89 PaCal.2d 109], this court said: “… some confusion exists with reference to what constitutes an excess, and what constitutes an error, in the exercise of jurisdiction. However, it seems well settled (and there appears to be no case holding to the contrary) that when a statute authorizes prescribed procedure, and the court acts contrary to the authority thus conferred, it has exceeded its jurisdiction, and certiorari will lie to correct such excess.”

The Petition for review, that is the subject of this proceeding, not only addressed the standard under which this court may grant review but also described the Court of Appeal and the Riverside Superior Court actions that mandate review.


Petitioner respectfully respects that this court grant the application to reinstate the petition for review for good cause. Petitioner respectfully requests that the Chief Justice of this Court disqualify herself from this proceeding.

Petitioner declares under the penalty of perjury in the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and that the attached exhibit is a true and accurate copy of the docket listed in case Ronald Pierce et al vs Tani Cantil-Sakauye Case 13-17170.

Respectfully submitted,

xxxxxxxx 7/20/2014




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