Parents do not have the first amendment right to privacy. Invasion of privacy by the court system.

The infamous “what if statement” has been used to deny a perfectly valid request for custody based on hypothetical scenarios that are not based on evidence.

What if covers a whole range of scenarios.

As a hypothetical scenario, what if you were very aware that a court invades your privacy as a parent, and harasses your children at a school?

What if you were aware that a court deliberately prevents you from obtaining work and prevents you from achieving anything to keep you tied to to an insane situation?

What if you were aware that a court deprives you of earning ability?.

What if you were aware that a court monitors your phone calls, emails, and prevents you from actually having a life and interferes with any close relationship that you may have?

What if the court invades your privacy and deliberately tortures you to an unbelievable degree as that is the only tool that this court has against you as they cannot use any legal means to torture you?

What would you do as a parent in response to protect your children, your life and your friends?

How would you react to the total destruction of your life?

By NewsViews Posted in Law, News

1034 DAYS; 89,337,600 seconds; 1,488,960 minutes; 24,816 hours.

DAYS18
This is the time that the Fourth District Division two court of appeal has been sitting on one custody appeal, described here: https://viewsandnewsriversidesuperiourcourt.wordpress.com/2014/04/19/fourth-district-division-two-sits-on-custody-appeal-for-over-two-years/ The appeal was consolidated with a restraining order appeal which has also been pending for 754 days.

https://viewsandnewsriversidesuperiourcourt.wordpress.com/2014/04/19/fourth-district-considers-denied-restraining-order-appeal/

Under any relevant legal standard this appeal needs to be reversed. However it is more relevant to engage in judicial retaliation and discrimination to protect the trial court rather than addressing the law as demonstrated by the recent rulings that have originated from this court. Children can NEVER obtain that time back nor can any affected parent especially considering some of the heinous circumstances described in this case.

News and Views Riverside Superior Court and San Bernardino Superior Court; National Family Law Abuse

DAYS

    • 87,436,800 seconds
    • 1,457,280 minutes
    • 24,288 hours

This is the time that the Fourth District Division two court of appeal has been sitting in one custody appeal, described here:https://viewsandnewsriversidesuperiourcourt.wordpress.com/2014/04/19/fourth-district-division-two-sits-on-custody-appeal-for-over-two-years/  The appeal was consolidated with a restraining order appeal which has also been pending for 733 days.

https://viewsandnewsriversidesuperiourcourt.wordpress.com/2014/04/19/fourth-district-considers-denied-restraining-order-appeal/

Under any relevant legal standard this appeal needs to be reversed. However it is more relevant to engage in judicial retaliation and discrimination to protect the trial court rather than addressing the law as demonstrated by the recent rulings that have originated from this court. Children can NEVER obtain that time back nor can any affected parent especially considering some of the heinous circumstances described in this case.

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“When they can’t get into court to have those issues heard … it’s a violation of those rights.”

These are the profound words of our current Riverside Superior Court Presiding Judge, Mark Cope.

The below statement was part of a comment on the current budget crisis in our Superior Court, published in the Gavel Grab.

“People have a civil right, and therefore a constitutional right to have
their issues resolved in a fair way,” the presiding judge in Riverside
County, Mark Cope, said. “When they can’t get into court to have those
issues heard … it’s a violation of those rights.”

http://www.gavelgrab.org/?p=68971

On his online running platform, under justice, Judge Cope advocates that “The role of a judge is not to make law, but to apply it”.http://www.democracy.com/JudgeCope/issues.aspx?Tag=Justice

Although as litigants we truly appreciate the sentiment, the reality that parents and children deal with in the Riverside Superior Court is very different. Our cases are not heard and most of us have our constitutional rights violated on a day to day basis, with cases languishing for years as the Court refuses to address the legal standard required to overturn heinous criminal custody orders where parents and their children alike suffer and are tormented. The sentiment is to sweep everything under a rug hoping that we will go away or to perpetuate the malicious legal rape and battery that has become the norm. For most of us giving up on our children is not a possibility, as our children as parents are all we care about, and the Court is our only option.

Our constitution in this country guarantees that the relationship between parents and their children is accorded a protected preferential status and we have the first amendment right to have our cases addressed. The fourteenth amendment substantive due process right to a protected familial parent child relationship was already recognized in IDK, Inc. v. County of Clark, 836 F.2d 1185, 1192 (9th Cir. Nev. 1988) and Carey v.Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 684-685 (1977), where the United States Supreme Court repeatedly teaches that there is “a right of personal privacy” which includes “family relationships,” and child rearing and education.

We expect justice and we expect that the court addresses the law and that our protected rights under the constitution be treated that way. That scenario does not exist in the Riverside Superior Court. Why for example is a litigant denied access to the Court system for a year, while their paperwork vegetates on a desk somewhere? https://viewsandnewsriversidesuperiourcourt.wordpress.com/2013/08/05/riverside-superior-court-sabotages-litigation-against-the-best-interest-of-the-child-by-filing-a-document-one-year-later-after-it-was-received-ppeal/

Why are our children forced to suffer due to the heinous orders initiated by a court that violated all due process accorded by the relevant statute and the fourteenth amendment equal protection standard, merely as the relevant judicial officer wanted to teach a parent a lesson and was fixated on punishing a litigant with his/her children?

Why can none of us obtain the legal relief in the interest of justice that we are entitled to under the statute as there was a blatant miscarriage of justice which the court can correct pursuant to CCP section 128.(a)(8) and CA family code section 3022 and the Court refuses that we file the appropriate and necessary litigation to address these orders?

Words, your Honor are meaningless, unless the appropriate action mirroring those words is implemented, and we are accorded the relief that we are constitutionally entitled to.

Rule 8.260. Opinions [Reserved]

So specifies title eight rule 8.260, meaning that the opinion section of title eight rules of court has not been established yet, nor the formal policy governing said opinions and how they are supposed to be applied to litigants.

Anyone who is familiar with our Fourth District Court of Appeal in Riverside knows that the court has a policy of releasing tentative opinions before they are binding to allow a litigant the opportunity to disagree at oral argument.

Most litigants can agree that in theory this is a good policy. It provides litigants with an overview of the direction that the panel is leaning to before an official subjective opinion is reached. However, as many of us had the considerable misfortune to experience the court of appeal fails to address any mistakes, ambiguities or outright fabrications at oral argument. Instead the time of the litigant is wasted, as is the time of the three panel judiciary who has to reconstitute itself every so often in a judicial conga shuffle, to allow a different panel to hear oral argument. The fact is no one likes to hear that they have made a mistake and a justice will simply not correct his/her errors. Continue reading

Calling for legislative changes to the VLS statute.

Most CA family law parents who have been muzzled by a trial court have been deemed vexatious. The purpose is to place a legal gag order on parents as generally in most cases there is court corruption or heinous rulings that the court desperately wants to cover up, hence the legal muzzling.

Originally the vexatious litigant statute (VLS) in CA was intended to apply to litigants who sued judges; and upon a proposal by the Los Angeles county bar association the VLS statute in CA was born.

The court’s ability to make such a determination originated from an obscure and little-known state statute. In 1963, the California legislature passed the Vexatious Litigant Statute (“VLS”), defining and regulating vexatious litigants. In 1990, the California Legislature amended the VLS to provide state court judges the power to issue “prefiling orders,” which, once issued, bar individuals previously or contemporaneously classified as vexatious litigants from filing additional complaints without first obtaining leave from the court where the litigation is proposed to be filed. The VLS is relatively unique among state statutes. Over the years the judicial council has amended its application to include family law proceedings where it  cannot be applied as family law is dynamic and the underlying family law or appeal case litigation is not addressed in the VLS statute. The review process and changes by the judicial council can be viewed in previous changes to the statute.  http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/20101214item3.pdf

Our California Supreme Court has specified that the vexatious litigant application cannot be applied in one CIVIL case as defined in the Shalant court. For the purposes of defining civil law, family law is contained in Civil law as helpfully specified by the legal aid society. Civil law refers to almost all other disputes—these are the rules that apply when one  person sues another person, a business or agency. This can cover a housing case such as
for eviction or foreclosure, a family case such as divorce or custody, consumer problems  such as debt or bankruptcy, or when someone sues for money because of damage to  property or personal harm. All of these cases go to a Civil Court.

The Shalant opinion specified:  “Reading the vexatious litigant statutes as a collective whole, defendants’ construction is not a plausible one. If “litigation” as defined in section 391, subdivision (a) included every motion or other procedural step taken during an action or special proceeding, and that definition were applied throughout the vexatious litigant statutes, several provisions would take on absurd, unworkable, or clearly unintended meanings. Under section 391, subdivision (b)(1), a person could be declared a vexatious litigant for losing five motions—all of which might have been filed in the same lawsuit—in a seven-year period. Section 391, subdivision (b)(3)’s reference to “motions, pleadings, or other papers” filed in the course of a litigation would make little sense if every motion, pleading, or paper filed was itself a new litigation. Under section 391.1, the defendant could move for an order requiring the plaintiff to post security each time the plaintiff filed a motion or took any other procedural step. The trial court would then have to hold a hearing—separate from any hearing on the motion itself—and determine whether the plaintiff was reasonably likely to prevail on the motion or other procedural step. (§ 391.2.) On a negative finding, the court would then be required to order the plaintiff to furnish security, presumably cumulative to any ordered at earlier stages of the action. (§ 391.3.) If the plaintiff failed to provide the security, the action would, according to section 391.4, be “dismissed,” though the negative ruling on a motion is ordinarily referred to as a “denial” rather than a “dismissal.”

Under section 391.7 itself, defendants’ construction of “litigation” would be unworkable. A vexatious litigant in Shalant’s position, having filed the action through counsel but then having lost representation, would be required to seek permission of the presiding judge before filing any motion or other paper. The presiding judge of the court would thus be placed in the position of overseeing each procedural step of an action pending in another department and deciding in each instance whether the particular motion, pleading, or paper had “merit.” (§ 391.7, subd. (b).)[5] If the clerk inadvertently filed any motion or other paper from the plaintiff, a notice from any other party that the plaintiff was subject to a prefiling order would automatically stay the “litigation” (§ 391.7, subd. (c))—that is, the particular motion filed or other procedural step taken—but the rest of the action would not necessarily be stayed at the same time. Pretrial and trial proceedings would be constantly interrupted for trips to the presiding judge’s department; an orderly and efficient trial would be impossible. Again, the statute provides that if permission is not granted, an inadvertently filed litigation is to be “dismissed” (ib id.), indicating the drafters did not intend each motion, which would ordinarily be granted or denied, but not “dismissed,” to be considered a separate “litigation.”

(11) Section 391.7, then, is not reasonably susceptible to a reading under which a prefiling order would bar the vexatious litigant from filing motions or other papers in propria persona even when the action (or special proceeding (see §§ 22, 23)) was itself properly filed through counsel. Any ambiguity on this point, moreover, would be dispelled by examination of the legislative history behind section 391.7’s enactment, which shows a clear focus on precluding vexatious litigants from filing in propria persona unmeritorious new “actions” or “lawsuits.”[7] Nowhere in this history is there any suggestion the new section would bar vexatious litigants from filing motions or papers in pending litigation.

The additional remedy provided by section 391.7 was, instead, “directed at precluding the initiation of a meritless lawsuit and the costs associated with defending such litigation.” (Bravo v. Ismaj, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 222, italics added.); Shalant v. Girardi, (2011) 253 P. 3d 266).

Technically assuming that the legal construction of the VLS statute holds as outlined in the Shalant court, the VLS statute cannot be applied to family law cases as a person would have to be married and divorced 5 times in seven year to qualify as a vexatious litigant pursuant to CCP § 391 (a). California has a mandatory six months waiting period before a dissolution judgment can be granted once a divorce petition has been filed therefore it is a legal impossibility to remarry and divorce 5 times in seven years.

The specific reason why the VLS statute cannot be applied in family law cases and in appellate case has been detailed below. Continue reading

Appellate division of the Riverside Superior court reverses illegal injunction filing order but upholds illegal eviction.

The appellate division of the Superior Court issued its opinion relating to a filing injunction and relating to the illegal eviction in an unlawful detainer case. The court reversed the filing injunction but declined to take into consideration the fact that the co-defendant in this case was never served and alleged that the appellant had never presented why she had standing to bring this issue up as a witness to the lack of service, defendant and joint title holder of the property. The appellant had indeed brought this very issue up in her opening brief and cited a case that was to the point of the unlawful detainer lack of service where the appellate court in that case reversed. Indeed the unlawful detainer court initially refused to set the matter for trial as the co-defendant was never served.

The appellate division as basis for it decision instead cited a Federal case that has no relevance to an unlawful detainer case, as it deals with jury selection and certainly does not refer to third party standing in an unlawful detainer case. The case cited was Powers v. Ohio – 499 U.S. 400 (1991) a jury selection case that dealt with race issues in peremptory challenges.

“During jury selection at his state court trial for aggravated murder and related offenses, petitioner Powers, a white man, objected to the State’s use of peremptory challenges to remove seven black venirepersons from the jury. Powers’ objections, which were based on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, were overruled, the impaneled jury convicted him on several counts, and he was sentenced to prison. On appeal, he contended that the State’s discriminatory use of peremptories violated, inter alia, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, and that his own race was irrelevant to the right to object to the peremptories. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.
Held: Under the Equal Protection Clause, a criminal defendant may object to race-based exclusions of jurors through peremptory challenges whether or not the defendant and the excluded jurors share the same race. Pp. 499 U. S. 404-416.”

The opinion and opening brief have been included below. Of course the fact that one of the judges on the unlawful detainer appellate panel has a conflict of interest as he refused to rescind the sale of the joint community property case in a related foreclosure action has no “relevance”. Continue reading

Alien tort act, an unexplored concept in Federal Law.

28. U.S.C § 1350, allows a private cause of action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nation of a treaty of the United States. It is a concept of the law that is not applied in every day law.  The statute of limitation for a cause of action under the alien tort act is ten years and allows an “alien” to file a suit in a the U.S. federal district court citing violation of international law.

Section 1350 grants a cause of action and the section “creates a cause of action for violations of specific, universal and obligatory international human rights standards”), cert. denied, — U.S. —-, 115 S.Ct. 934, 130 L.Ed.2d 879 (1995); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.Supp. 162, 179 (D.Mass.1995) (“Sec. 1350 yields both a jurisdictional grant and a private right to sue for tortious violations of international law … without recourse to other law as a source of the cause of action.”); Paul v. Avril, 812 F.Supp. 207, 212 (S.D.Fla.1993) (“The plain language of the statute and the use of the words ‘committed in violation’ strongly implies that a well plead tort[,] if committed in violation of the law of nations, would be sufficient [to give rise to a cause of action].”); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F.Supp. 1531, 1539 (N.D.Cal.1987) (same), on reconsideration on other grounds, 694 F.Supp. 707 (N.D.Cal.1988).

This particular law does have relevance for any parent and their children who have citizenship of another country; in particular it allows a remedy to sue a court who is classified as a state actor for the purposes of international law.

CA governmental code § 810.2 defines employee as an officer, Judicial officer as defined in § 327 of the Elections code, (where Judicial officer means any Justice of the Supreme Court, Justice of a court of appeal or a judge of the superior court), employee or servant whether or not compensated.

Any Court is classified as a state actor by UN General Assembly Resolution 56/83 which defines the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts under articles 4, 5 namely:

1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial unit of the State.

2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the State.

Under Article 5:

The conduct of persons or entities exercising elements of governmental authority as defined in article 4 (1) shall be considered an act of the State under international law, where the person or entity is acting in that capacity in that particular instance.

Judicial action qualifies as state action for procedural due process purposes. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 Led. 1161 (1948) and under article 5 cited above the conduct of a mediator and evaluator who was exercising elements of governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State.

The ATCA is unique in that it allows for aliens, regardless of where they are domiciled, to bring actions for torts in U.S. courts, regardless of where the tort occurred and the ATCA does not provide for immunity defense claims of government, (state), employees, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980).

On its face, section 1350 requires the district courts to hear claims “by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations.” 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1350 (West 1993) (emphasis added).(“[The] statute confers federal subject-matter jurisdiction when the following three conditions are satisfied: (1) an alien sues (2) for a tort (3) committed in violation of the law of nations (i.e., international law).”); Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1475.

‘[N]othing more than a violation of the law of nations is required to invoke section 1350’, (quoting Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 779 (Edwards, J., concurring)); Xuncax, 886 F.Supp. at 180 (“All that the statute requires is that an alien plaintiff allege that a ‘tort’ was committed ‘in violation’ of international law or treaty of the United States.”). Moreover, the “committed in violation” language of the statute suggests that Congress did not intend to require an alien plaintiff to invoke a separate enabling statute as a precondition to relief under the Alien Tort Claims Act. See, e.g., Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F.Supp. 1421, 1427 (C.D.Cal.1985) (“[T]he ‘violation’ language of section 1350 may be interpreted as explicitly granting a cause of action….”); Paul, 812 F.Supp. at 212 (same); Forti, 672 F.Supp. at 1539 (same). This holding is endorsed in the recently enacted Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), Pub.L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73. In enacting the TVPA, Congress endorsed the Filartiga line of cases: The TVPA would establish an unambiguous and modern basis for a cause of action that has been successfully maintained under an existing law, section 1350 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (the Alien Tort Claims Act), which permits Federal district courts to hear claims by aliens for torts committed “in violation of the law of nations.” H.R.Rep. No. 367, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1992 .S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86 (emphasis added). Congress, therefore, has recognized that the Alien Tort Claims Act confers both a forum and a private right of action to aliens alleging a violation of international law.

The Alien Tort Claims Act establishes a federal forum where courts may fashion domestic common law remedies to give effect to violations of customary international law by government officials or state actors, see, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236; Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Xuncax, 886 F.Supp. at 179-83, which applies in this case.

Judicial opinions that have had occasion to impart meaning to § 1350 have not reached a consensus regarding the statute’s import. A majority of courts, interpreting the statute broadly, have held that if an alien plaintiff can establish that the abuses allegedly inflicted upon his/her constitute violations of international law, § 1350 grants both a federal private cause of action as well as a federal forum in which to assert the claim., see, e.g., Marcos Estate II, 25 F.3d at 1475 (9th Cir.1994) (§ 1350 “creates a cause of action for violations of specific, universal and obligatory human rights standards,”); Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 424-25 (2d Cir.1987), rev’d on other grounds, 488 U.S. 428, 109 S.Ct. 683, 102 L.Ed.2d 818 (1989) Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir.1980); Paul v. Avril, 812 F.Supp. 207, 212 (S.D.Fla.1993); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F.Supp. 1531, 1539 (N.D.Cal.1987), on reconsideration on other grounds, 694 F.Supp. 707 (N.D.Cal.1988). The Ninth Circuit has concluded that § 1350 plaintiffs may look to municipal law as a source of substantive law. See Marcos Estate I, 978 F.2d at 503 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 972, 113 S.Ct. 2960, 125 L.Ed.2d 661 (1993).

The federal court has already recognized that federal government officials are not immune to tort claims and that the state waives its immunity if they don’t adhere to legislative rules and procedures designed to protect the public, Hollingshead v. United States, 85-2 USTC 9772 (5th Cir. 1985). The same analogy applies to state employees under the alien tort act which specifically allows a cause of actions against state employees, who do not follow the mandatory legislative procedures and violate constitutional safeguards.

In a similar manner the federal court has already recognized that the Alien tort act allows for reciprocal action notably in the “Apartheid cases”, where South African plaintiffs’ sued multinational defendants that were located in the United States in part due also to the actions perpetrated upon U.S soil, Ntsebeza v. Daimler AG., 617 F. Supp. 2d.228. 2009. U.S. Dist. Lexis. 34572; Khulumani v. Barclays Nat. 1. Bank. Ltd. 504. F.3d. 254 (2nd Circ. 2009).

By NewsViews Posted in Law, News

Proposed Proposal to Judicial Council to abolish forced mediator recommendation proposed orders in CA family law cases, input from public requested.

PROPOSAL TO ABOLISH THE MEDIATOR’S RECOMMENDATION IN CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW PROCEEDINGS.

The CA Judicial council allows the public to provide a proposal under CA rules of court 10.21 relating to rules, forms etc and a draft proposal and the request to abolish the forced adoption of mediator recommendation proposed orders has been presented below. Please provide your comments or feedback to be incorporated as applicable.

Pursuant to California Rules of court 10.21, the members of the public hereby present a proposal to abolish the forced mediation process in all family law cases in California.

The trial court system in the State of California has a policy of forcing family law parties into mediation once a request for order is filed.  An informal poll publicly offered to evaluate the mediation process, viewsandnewsriversidesuperiourcourt.wordpress.com/2013/08/27/call-to-the-public-to-express-their-experience-with-family-law-mediation-3/  illustrates that mediation is not effective nor does it comply with the law as defined in California rules of court 5.210 . In 38% of cases mediation did not comply with the CA rules of court; in 25% of cases there was no agreement at mediation and a recommendation was made; in 25% of cases there was no agreement at the hearing or in writing and the recommendation was adopted as the order of the court.

The term used to describe the process is child custody recommendation counseling which is still defined as mediation pursuant to CA family code § 3183.

The purpose of mediation is defined in CA family code § 3161 as follows:

(a) To reduce acrimony that may exist between the parties.

(b) To develop an agreement assuring the child close and continuing contact with both parents that is in the best interest of the child, consistent with Sections 3011 and 3020.

(c) To effect a settlement of the issue of visitation rights of all parties that is in the best interest of the child.

The sole purpose according to the statute is to reach an agreement between the parties. However the Superior Courts have implemented a policy of developing mediator’s recommendations after each mediation which proposes an order to the judge assigned to the case.  The basis of this concept is allegedly based on  CA family code § 3183 as follows:

(a) Except as provided in Section 3188, the mediator may, consistent with local court rules, submit a recommendation to the court as to the custody of or visitation with the child, if  the mediator has first provided  the parties and their  attorneys, including counsel for any minor children, with the  recommendations in writing in advance of the hearing. The court shall make an inquiry at the hearing as to whether the parties and their attorneys have received the recommendations in writing. If the mediator is authorized to submit a recommendation to the court pursuant to this subdivision, the mediation and recommendation process shall be referred to as “child custody recommending counseling” and the mediator shall be referred to as a “child custody recommending counselor.”

Mediators who make those recommendations are considered mediators for purposes of Chapter 11 (commencing with Section 3160), and shall be subject to all requirements for mediators for all purposes under this code and the California Rules of Court. On and after January 1, 2012, all court communications and information regarding the child custody recommending counseling process shall reflect the change in the name of the process and the name of the providers.

(b) If the parties have not reached agreement as a result of the mediation proceedings, the mediator may recommend to the  court that an investigation be conducted pursuant to Chapter 6 (commencing with Section 3110)or that other services be offered  to assist the parties to effect a resolution of the controversy before a hearing on the issues.

(c) In appropriate cases, the mediator may recommend that restraining orders be issued, pending determination of the controversy, to protect the well-being of the child involved in the controversy.

CA family code § 3183 specifies that the mediator has to notify the court that the parties have not reached an agreement underlining the sole purpose of mediation, which is to attempt to reach an agreement and only specifies the word “may” as the policy of providing recommendations to the trial court, not a mandatory “shall”. CA evidence code  § 1119 and § 1121 defines the word shall in the context of mediation.

However, the trial courts in the State of California abuse the mediation process, forcing mediation when no agreement can be reached by the parties merely to develop a recommendation and a proposed order that is signed by a mediator and rubber stamped by the assigned judicial officer, in violation of CA evidence code  § 1119, 1118-1121.

The recommendation and proposed order offers no value to the parties as it is considered hearsay under CA evidence code  § 1200 b.

In addition the CA evidence code, (the mandatory process by which a court of law HAS to apply the law), specifies that any statement or conduct that occurred in or originates during the course of mediation is confidential.

The evidence code concerning the practice of mediation is very specific as follows:

CA EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 1115-1128

1115.  For purposes of this chapter:

(a) “Mediation” means a process in which a neutral person or persons facilitate communication between the disputants to assist them in reaching a mutually acceptable agreement.

(b) “Mediator” means a neutral person who conducts a mediation.

“Mediator” includes any person designated by a mediator either to assist in the mediation or to communicate with the  participants in preparation for a mediation.

(c) “Mediation consultation” means a communication between a person and a mediator for the purpose of initiating, considering, or reconvening a mediation or retaining the mediator.

1116.  (a) Nothing in this chapter expands or limits a court’s authority to order participation in a dispute resolution proceeding. Nothing in this chapter authorizes or affects the enforceability of a contract clause in which parties agree to the use of mediation.

(b) Nothing in this chapter makes admissible evidence that is  inadmissible under Section 1152 or any other statute.

1118.  An oral agreement “in accordance with Section 1118” means an oral agreement that satisfies all of the following conditions:

(a) The oral agreement is recorded by a court reporter or reliable means of audio recording.

(b) The terms of the oral agreement are recited on the record in the presence of the parties and the mediator, and the parties express on the record that they agree to the terms recited.

(c) The parties to the oral agreement expressly state on the record that the agreement is enforceable or binding, or words  to that effect.

(d) The recording is reduced to writing and the writing is signed by the parties within 72 hours after it is recorded.

1119.  Except as otherwise provided in this chapter:

(a) No evidence of anything said or any admission made for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation or a mediation consultation is admissible or subject to discovery, and disclosure of the evidence shall not be compelled, in any arbitration, administrative adjudication, civil action, or other noncriminal proceeding in which, pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled to be given.

(b) No writing, as defined in Section 250, that is prepared for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation or a mediation consultation, is admissible or subject to discovery, and disclosure of the writing shall not be compelled, in any arbitration, administrative adjudication, civil action, or other noncriminal proceeding in which, pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled to be given.

(c) All communications, negotiations, or settlement discussions by and between participants in the course of a mediation or a mediation consultation shall remain confidential.

1121.  Neither a mediator nor anyone else may submit to a court or other adjudicative body, and a court or other adjudicative body may not consider, any report, assessment, evaluation, recommendation, or finding of any kind by the mediator  concerning a mediation conducted by the mediator, other than a  report that is mandated by court rule or other law and that states only whether an agreement was reached, unless all parties to the mediation expressly agree otherwise in writing, or  orally in accordance with Section 1118.

1122.  (a) A communication or a writing, as defined in Section 250, that is made or prepared for the purpose of, or in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation or a mediation consultation, is not made inadmissible, or protected from disclosure, by provisions of this chapter if either of the  following conditions is satisfied:

(1) All persons who conduct or otherwise participate in the mediation expressly agree in writing, or orally in accordance with section 1118, to disclosure of the communication, document, or writing.

(2) The communication, document, or writing was prepared by or on behalf of fewer than all the mediation participants,  those participants expressly agree in writing, or orally in accordance with Section 1118, to its disclosure, and the  communication, document, or writing does not disclose anything  said or done or any admission made in the course of the mediation.

(b) For purposes of subdivision (a), if the neutral person who conducts a mediation expressly agrees to disclosure, that  agreement also binds any other person described in subdivision (b) of Section 1115.

1128.  Any reference to a mediation during any subsequent trial is an irregularity in the proceedings of the trial for the purposes of Section 657 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Any reference to a mediation during any other subsequent noncriminal proceeding is grounds for vacating or modifying the decision in that proceeding, in whole or in part, and granting a new or further hearing on all or part of the issues, if the reference materially affected the substantial rights of the party requesting relief.

This issue has already been addressed in numerous appeal court rulings including the Supreme Court which  has repeatedly stated that mediation confidentiality is absolute and cannot be used as evidence in any civil proceeding, which by definition also includes family law. The latest ruling on this matter occurred In Cassel v. Courier Superior Court, 51 Cal.4th 113, 244 P. 3d 1080 (January 13, 2011), where the client brought an action against attorneys who represented him in a mediation in a malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and breach of contract action.

At trial the attorneys made a motion in limine using the statute relating to mediation confidentiality (Cal. Evid. Code §1119(a), (b)) to exclude all evidence of communications between the client and the lawyer that were related to the mediation, including what was discussed in pre-mediation meetings and private communications between the client and attorneys during the mediation. The Supreme Court once again ruled that mediation confidentiality is absolute, following similar rulings already defined in Foxgate Homeowners Association, Inc., v. Bramalea California, Inc. (July 9, 2001) 26 Cal.4th 1, where the Supreme Court took a surprisingly strong stand on behalf of mediation confidentiality. In a 6-0 decision, it concluded that there were “no exceptions” to the mandatory mediation confidentiality rule under Evidence Code §1119, or to the statutory limits on reporting by a mediator under Evidence Code § 1121.

The Court rejected the argument that judicial construction of the statute was needed to avoid frustrating the legislative intent, or to avoid an absurd result. The clear language of the statute precludes mediator reporting, and requires strict confidentiality for all mediation communication.

We the public request the judicial council to abolish the forced mediation recommendation proposed orders  and their recommendations upon which the proposed orders are based and the forced mediation recommendation process when there has been no agreement reached during mediation.

Due process violations alive and well in Department PS2 of the Riverside Superior Court.

The Riverside Superior Court has completely re-structured itself for reasons largely unknown to the general public.  All civil cases for example were moved to Palm Springs. One would assume that with the re-structuring and new judges that the law would prevail and be applied. Alas that is not the case.  A tentative decision in a civil case was very specific in its due process violations involving attorneys.

In INC 1205453 Dobbins v. Dobbins the court announced a tentative decision to sanction the attorneys for filing a motion to compel further responses to special interrogatories. The reason cited was lack of justification for filing the motion, i.e. “Court finds that this motion was filed without substantial justification, and imposes  sanctions against the moving party in the amount of $750.00 payable to defense within  20 days. Prevailing party to give notice.”

Both parties in that case are represented by attorneys which requires that notice and opportunity to be heard  be provided before allocating sanctions to satisfy the legislative mandatory due process requirements. The relevant appeal cases have already addresses that issue:

Blumenthal v. Superior Court (1980), 103 Cal..App.3d 317Corralejo v. Quiroga (1984), 152 Cal.App.3d 871 [notice for 128.5 sanctions against attorney required too satisfy due process].
 In another case the court denied an exparte citing an invalid proof of service when the notice of exparte hearing was mailed.
The manner of the notice is not specified and a party may notify another party by mail of an exparte hearing as long as the notification is before ten am the prior business day, pursuant to CA rule 3.1203
Perhaps the Court may want to familiarize itself with the law instead of allocating a belief standard to its rulings violating CA rules of court and the mandatory equal protection and legislative due process standard defined by the relevant statute.

Comments on VLS petition demonstrate its malevolent abuse by the CA judiciary.

A petition to abolish the vexatious litigant statute application in family law, http://www.change.org/petitions/steven-jahr-director-of-the-aoc-abolish-the-vexatious-litigant-statute-in-family-law-cases-in-california,  has gathered quite a few comments demonstrating the malicious abuse of the CA judiciary in family law proceedings.

Litigants have been declared vexatious by simply filing a response to an order to show cause and attorneys have been declared vexatious by simply providing legal advice rather than actively representing their clients in a case.

The comments have been included below:

Donna Farris Greenfield, ME 2013-09-04 Parental Rights are essential to protecting our precious children.

Denise Ellen Austin Australia 2013-09-05 Justice for all, not just a few.

Ana Cuebas Catano, Puerto Rico 2013-09-05 If there is one area of law that requires the parties to be heard that area is family law. We are talking about the destiny of our nation, our children.

Jorge Ambert san juan, Puerto Rico 2013-09-05 real justice should be served

Ingrid Blank Merrivale, South Africa 2013-09-06 California family courts in particular must be a breeding ground for “delusional” and “vexatious” parents, who all have one common denominator – their human, civil and constitutional rights have been grossly violated by incompetent and morally delinquent commissioners/judges, who courtordered their children into custody of batterers and molesters or their kidnapping and trafficking by CPS. The courts are banking on the fact that parents will keep fighting to get their children back, thus providing a bottomless source of income for judges and the associated “cottage industry”, i.e. unqualified and corrupt mediators/evaluators who can safely be compared to Pavlov’s dogs responding to the ringing bell of unethical wielders of power on the bench, attorneys and other corrupt individuals, feeding on the misery of parents and children. Pro Per litigants, especially those exposing the unbelievable carnage and anarchy in family courts, are effectively silenced by UNLAWFULLY declaring them “vexatious litigants”, whereas parents with a fat bank account and substantial assets are milked as “cash cows” until their children age out of the system.
A prime example of aberrant black-robed wielders of power running amok is Case IND 098669
and INC 10002737 in the RIVERSIDE SUPERIOR COURT, which already caused global outrage.
The judicial officers, notably JUDGE DALE WELLS, conspiring under the color of law with one of
the vilest, narcissistic abusers imaginable to eradicate a protective mother from her children’s
lives single handedly managed to put the Riverside Superior Court on the global map as a
kangaroo court and organized crime entity, as documented on this petition:
<a href=”http://www.change.org/petitions/california-state-auditor-forensic-audit-judge-dale-wellsriverside-superior-court&#8221; rel=”nofollow”>http://www.change.org/petitions/california-state-auditorforensic-audit-judge-dale-wells-riverside-superior-court</a&gt;
The respective presiding judges – first Judge Cahraman, then Judge Ellsworth and now Judge
Cope – miserably and intentionally failed to perform their duty as a presiding judge by refusing to investigate the multiple IMPEACHABLE acts of judicial malfeasance and blatant fraud upon the court committed by the judicial officers involved in the above case, instead they excused and covered up these heinous human, civil and constitutional rights abuses and torture with an
“exercise of judicial discretion” which does not even exist as under the Supreme Law of the Land “courts are the mere instruments of the law and can will nothing. When they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere LEGAL discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by LAW, and when that is discerned it is the DUTY of the court to follow it. JUDICIAL POWER IS NEVER EXERCISED FOR THE PURPOSE OF GIVING EFFECT TO THE WILL OF THE JUDGE;always exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law. Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 412 (7th Cir. 1972), citing Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat (22 U.S.) 738, 866, 6 L.Ed 204 (1824); U.S. v.Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1991).
Millions of parents in each and every state are rising up, demanding JUSTICE and the removal of black-robed child torturers from the bench who don’t give a rat’s behind about the suffering of little children. The “in the best interest of the child” is a foreign concept to them and has clearly been replaced by “the best interest of the judge and associated cottage industry”.
Children are treated as non-sentient beings on par with animals, although the latter enjoy even
more protection under the law as the most vulnerable of society – our children and grandchildren.
A nation that allows morally delinquent judges to torture and destroy the lives of loving parents
and their children has lost its moral compass. Unethical presiding judges and appellate court judges who violate their oath of office by covering up the judicial malfeasance of their colleagues must likewise be removed from the bench and replaced by ethical judges who actually KNOW and ABIDE BY THE LAW. California Taxpayers are no longer prepared to pay the obscene salaries of corrupt judges for the “privilege” of being judicially battered and raped.

Nancy Witherell Redding, CA 2013-09-07 Whie abolishing statutes that support the ongoing destruction of the lives of children and families, please don’t leave out the worst one of all – confidentiality which primarily protects and hides the horrific lies and manipulations
perpetrated by the “agency” and the courts. Someday they will look upon this time and these practices as we look at Nazi, Germany. So much for the protection of the people and for the constitution and the bill of rights. All just empty words and promises. We might as well be living in a communist country – the corruption runs so deep it has become normal and acceptable.
Each time a social worker lies (which usually happens when their lips are moving), they know they doing something illegal but but somehow have come to believe that they are sacrificing for the protection of the children from their :”Bio Parents” (a title said with disdain and disgust).

Karen Ellis Encinitas, CA 2013-09-08 My kids were WRONGLY and ILLEGALLY kidnapped from me by the San Diego Vista County Court Judges and made to live with their RAPIST (sperm
donor father)

Dixianne Hawks Chico, CA 2013-09-08 I have seen this law at work and it is an evil law that is used by the attorneys and the courts to avoid justice.

Dixianne Hawks Chico, CA 2013-09-09 There is money being made by taking these children and obviously the attorneys and the courts are in on the take. Fraud pure and simple, at they
expense of our children and their security. There are many reasons to believe that these children are being used for nefarious purposes. Often the parents lose all contact, no one cares more for these children than the parents.

Thomas Lee Meridian, ID 2013-09-10 Because I believe that the vexatious litigant statute conceals government corruption and punishes the litigator for filing what they are entitled to file. It’s a racket.

George Schuch chicago, IL 2013-09-10 applicable to my young family, albeit in IL, not California.

Michelle Geil marina del rey, CA 2013-09-11 Children are being hurt, this must stop!

Malinda Sherwyn West Hills, CA 2013-09-12 The Courts suppress and hide evidence behind this law. Children and DV victims suffer.

Brianne Bajo Acton, CA 2013-09-16 Beacuse I am a Mom.

Kini Cosma Klamath Falls, OR 2013-09-20 The minute a parent, especially pro per litigants, starts fighting back and exposes the unbelievable corruption, that parent is quickly declared a
“vexatious litigant” for no legal reason other than to silence that parent, in fact the application of the vexatious litigant statute in family court cases it unconstitutional.

Mary Franklin La Quinta, CA 2013-09-23 It is very, very importantant that the family court protect the abused (child or parent) and protect the legal rights (including to speedy judicial action) of children, abused parents, and to make sure that the abused are protected from
the abusers. Occasionally, inept judges prolong and permit abuse. I was a professional in the juvenile justice system, including abused and neglected children, and I know first hand how the system operates.

Maria V Cruz Martinez Juana Díaz, Puerto Rico 2013-09-23 Justicia para todos por igual

Peter G Tocci Leominster, MA 2013-09-25 Though not a CA resident, I’m showing my support for this petition because we have a systemic criminal condition in the US family court. California is in position to set a precedent that will help parents and children abused by courts all across the country.

Rob MacDonald Sandy, UT 2013-09-26 California family law is a disaster. Courts are run willy-nilly, judges do as they please, and there is little if any accountability. See: givebackmyson.com.

Norma Rothrock Hastings, NE 2013-09-27 Help parents restore their parental rights in court.
valerie nixon modesto, CA 2013-09-28 I wouldn’t have believed this to have been possible if I hadn’t lived through it myself. Marin County, CA is one of the worst offenders in giving custody to abusive parents. Justice and truth are not the goals of the family court. With enough money and a lying attorney, anything is possible. Shame on these Judicial representatives!

Anna Stoufflet Austin, TX 2013-10-01 Because the Austin, TX family courts and court personnel conspired to make me and my children completely without a voice, in the face of horrific and
violent abuse. The courts thought it reasonable to give my youngest child to my abusive ex, in spite of the fact that there was a current restraining order in place and that the only contact that had taken place since we had left my ex in 2006 was via forced and traumatic “reunification” meetings with a frankly abusive “therapist”, who actually laughed when my children said that their biological father hurt them! I was given full custody of the older children who are now nearly grown. As for the youngest, he promptly failed a grade in my ex’s custody and my older children and I were completely cut off from any contact with their trusting and innocent 8 year old brother. He will be turning 14 this October and I have not been allowed to see him at all since 2008 nor have his siblings been allowed to have any contact with the baby brother they
adored. How is this fair to children? What did my baby do wrong to be denied contact with his mother and older siblings? Nothing except be a child without human rights.

Patricia Barry Los Angeles, CA 2013-10-04 I am an attorney and my client and I have both named as vexatious litigants as judicial retaliation for outing San Mateo judges and San Mateo law enforcement for failure to arrest a violent felon who had guns. We picketed and passed out
fliers about the failure of the judges and law enforcement to protect the public and we got the guy arrested — 14 guns, 2 assault rifles, and 10,000 rounds of ammo. The judges continue to protect the violent felon and punish us. He has not even gone to trial. The judges do not care at all about protecting the public safety.

Amanda Molano Desert Hot Springs, CA 2013-10-04 They took my 4 year old son and gave him to his absent father in another state. I am awaiting my trial date to try and grt my baby back.

Michelle Massey Kalispell, MT 2013-10-05 Because Parents Have Rights.

Edgar Mejia Heber, UT 2013-10-15 I was declared a vl and i am outraged, her lawyer makes up lies and I wanted the truth to be exposed , all i got was the judge to shut my right to be heard.

Deborah Parks Auburndale, FL 2013-10-17 The vexatious litigant statute is the favorite tool used by a court in family law cases to cover up prior judicial malfeasance rulings. The point is to prevent a litigant especially in family law cases to seek redress of the heinous situation that did not occur in the best interest of the child standard. The trial court system in California abuses its application in family law proceedings, where they prevent that emergency request for orders are filed, they prevent that domestic violence restraining orders are filed or prevent that domestic violence restraining orders are dismissed, (there is a case in California where a parent had a 50 year restraining order granted against him). This parent has yet to obtain any relief. Other parents have been unable to restore their parental rights in any capacity.

Alicja Herriott Hermosa Beach, CA 2013-10-18 Vexatious litigant statue disciminates one party against other and it gaves a judge contral over the party. I was called a vexatious litigant becasue I was defending myself during the court hearings my ex -husband filed for. When Judge had found out that I appealed two of hers orders. which were removed by the court of appeal later time , she called me vexatious litigant. Now I have so much problem with filing any motion including a child support issues. The same Judge who was prejudice against me had total contral over me. She deproved me any rights to seek justice or protection under the law. I was lucky and after appeal case I requested a new judge and I was granted with real a
new Judge. The vexatious litigant staute does not prevents from anynecessary filings but
deprives other one party justice and give Judge a power to contral the case and give bias decisions. the vexatious litigant statue has no place in family law cases in California and it should be abolished as soon as possible.

Linda Rose Barragan Wrightwood, CA 2013-10-23 deemed vexatious when responding to an OSC to change custody and support

What does the Judicial Council actually do?

There appears to be quite a bit of rampant confusion as to the function of the  judicial council.  In the State of California it acts as the policy making body for the court system, with a number of sub committees responsible for defining said policies to establish a uniform environment for all trial courts. However, as the general public is very well aware it is practically toothless.   The judicial council maintains that it cannot intervene in individual cases. The general public is not asking that the judicial council intervene in individual cases, rather that it adheres to and enforces a uniform policy guideline requirement that it has stipulated for all trial courts, in the public interest. Not doing so violates the equal protection standard mandated by the 14th amendment, as a trial court’s failure to adhere to uniform policy guidelines suggests that it is practicing invidious discrimination against certain members of  the public, which could be defined as a class.

The public has a vested interested in an impartial tribunal, a service which the trial courts in California do not offer. Rather, the justice system has become a lunatic mockery of a self serving judiciary that plays games with the public rather than adhering to the law.  There is rampant and malicious abuse of the system where a uniform application of the law and policy guidelines are thrown out of the window. Continue reading

By NewsViews Posted in Law, News

Letter: Destroyed by no law followed in Riverside superior family court.

As requested the letter from a concerned litigant has been posted:

“My case is beyond anything sane or legal.  RID-233625.  I just got it into the appeals court, E 058656.  I paid court reporters for only the Sept. 29th 2011, June 7th 2012, Aug. 1st 2012 and Aug. 2nd 2012  transcripts to start.  Please post those and I can only hope my court reporters were not ordered to manipulate them like a few clerks and others in the court were used to hide the judges abuse of discretion and negligence.

The hell I have been put through after fleeing the state to escape threats to my life, abuse and stalking  by my ex spouse were compounded and encouraged by this court.  I had to hire a lawyer in Colorado to clean up just 2 of the hundreds of intimidation and threat tactics the riverside judge was to busy to even look at the stacks of evidence I had. Cost me my home of 18 years that was in my name, financially devastated me, my ex with the help of the court destroyed my bonds with my children and gandchildren, destroyed my good reputation, property, investments, good credit gone.  Allowed his continued menacing and deviant, highly criminal behavior.  I had forensic profiles (Judge Gunn did not bother to read) saying he was capable of murder and dangerous.

The court violated all of the Elkins family Law Task Force Recommendations.  I was not notified of hearings, changes in venues, tossed from pillar to post, threatened by the court that I made a “fatal error”,  messed with another case of my last California lawyer to make him back off from protecting my rights. Judgement slid by me, Statement of Decision full of serious and costly factual errors with no explanations.  Omissions.  Saying my motion to reconsider was allowed back on calender for Aug. 1st, flew in and was to fly out that night.  I was blown off, forced to come in the next day, costly rescheduling of my flight and then blown off again on the 2nd and told by the judge that I “cannot speak”.  Ex spouse getting away with purjury, violating discovery, fraud, contempt over and over, continual menacing of me.  Unprofessional lawyers easily manipulated by my forensically profiled paranoid schizophrenic with sociopathic tendencies spouse.

Wish me luck,  I fought back and the Judge (who was quoted in the Riverside Law magazine May 2010 as saying “the only experience I have in family law is that I got a divorce”)  slaughtered me.  Destroy a decent human being while letting a deviant and very sick one run rampant through the Halls of Justice???   I am not naive anymore.

Thank You,  Mary Jane Pederson”

The Caste System of the CA judiciary.

For those of us familiar with different cultures there is a strong familiarity with the Indian caste system that used to segregate the population into different classes.

The same concept exists in the CA judiciary, as only judicial officers according to prevailing belief are allowed to be parents. The rest of us are viewed as “vermin” and litigants and not parents. The Superior Court including the Riverside Superior court and the relevant court of appeal have developed a whole new “class” of individuals a concept that is not based on any law but a “belief”.

Under this concept, parents are “entitled” to be abused. The children in diverse cases deserve to be exposed to sheer hatred and insanity against the other parent with no relief in sight as they are viewed as IT entities, with no feelings or their RIGHT to a childhood. Indeed it is only the diverse judicial officers who are allocated the constitutional right to be a parent as demonstrated by former Presiding Judge Ellsworth who was hailed as a devoted mother in the media. However, she had no compunction in harming other mothers and their children where the court still covers up for rulings that occurred in certain cases.

The Riverside Superior Court and the Appeal Court have gone so far as to develop a new caste system, for the parents described above, labeled as the vexatious parent. There are no laws and procedures enshrined in the legislature that allows a court of appeal and the superior court to sit on family law litigation and to place an indefinite stay on proceedings. Indeed nowhere in the section 391 statute does it specify anywhere that a STAY can be placed on proceedings in any capacity. Instead California rules of court 1.20a specifically states: “Unless otherwise provided, a document is deemed filed on the date it is received by the court clerk”. By definition it does not matter if the court files it; the filing date is DEEMED when the court clerk receives it and needs to be addressed by the judicial officer involved in the time manner prescribed by statute. The Supreme Court has already struck down the invidious discrimination displayed by a court of appeal and a district court who engages in caste discrimination in the case of In Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327, 89 S.Ct. 1715, 23 L.Ed.2d 340 (1969), where the Supreme Court struck down a procedure where the petitioners seeking to reinstate an appeal were required to state what issues would be raised on appeal and to show that the previous denial of the appeal had been prejudicial to them.

A similar concept regarding stay provisions was addressed in a published opinion of a writ of supersedeas, which specified the following: “Special proceedings are subject to the stay provisions of Part 2 ONLY if the statute creating the special proceeding expressly incorporates them.”The court held that the order was not automatically stayed because the proceeding wasn’t really an “action” for purposes of the rules governing stays and undertakings on appeal in a civil “action.” (Code Civ. Proc. secs. 22-23.) In fact, the parties agreed that the involuntary dissolution suit was a “special proceeding” under Code of Civil Procedure section 23. Since the stay provisions (Code of Civil Procedure sections 916 et seq.) of Part 2 of the Code apply only in civil actions, the decree was not automatically stayed; Veyna v. Orange County Nursery, Inc., case no. G041305 (4th Dist. Jan. 15, 2009). The same concept applies to the stay system that the appeal court has creatively implemented with anyone that has been declared vexatious. First of all by implementing a stay the court of appeal recognizes the automatic stay provision of CCP section 916. More importantly the vexatious litigant statute quite categorically does not provide for a stay mechanism of an appeal, suggesting a fundamental violation of due process and equal protection of the law under the fourteenth amendment.

However, this does not stop these courts in engaging in sheer judicial battery and malfeasance abusing the law to retaliate against certain litigants. After all it’s just a game to the judiciary involved where children are viewed as nothing but trash to be discarded at will.

Perhaps presiding Judge Cope of the Riverside Superior Court can spare the litigants who are familiar with the Riverside Superior Court the sheer mockery of his statement: “This courthouse will stand as a beautiful metaphor and a beautiful symbol of the rule of law,” http://www.courts.ca.gov/17280.htm. The Riverside Superior court has demonstrated time and time again in its long history that the LAW does not exist in this court.

4th District Division Two appeals court discards law in another OMG moment.

In a move that can only be described as OMG, the Court of Appeal 4th district division two has chosen to ignore a mandatory law.

The background of this case is that the Department of child support initiated a case when one parent moved the children to San Bernardino county and placed the children on welfare.  There is a major  problem with this little scenario as that parent has a drug manufacturing felony and is prohibited from obtaining welfare under the Calworks program pursuant to CAL. WIC. CODE § 11251.3, which the Department is fully aware of.

The other problem is that the San Bernardino Superior Court relied on the Riverside Superior court mediator’s recommendation as the basis of its order, which is void as there was no agreement in writing or at the hearing pursuant to evidence code section 1118-1121 and cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding under evidence code section 1119.

So the Department of child support initiated a case against the other parent who is an immigrant and had obtained a preliminary injunction against the parent who is a party to the child support case to pay a support order as he signed a contract pursuant to   8 U.S.C.A. § 1183a(a)(1)(A), which states  “Once a sponsor files an Affidavit of Support, the sponsor agrees to support the sponsored immigrant at an annual rate of “not less than 125 percent of the Federal poverty line ” .

The affidavit of support is a mandatory requirement if an adjustment of status occurs, when certain conditions exist to prohibit the sponsored alien from becoming a public charge on the welfare system, and requires a minimum support  to prevent that said immigrant becomes a public welfare charge.

The irony is that to be eligible for welfare assistance in the State of California the maximum income considered to be eligible for welfare is  130 percent of the Federal poverty guideline.

The department of child support in the County of San Bernardino Child support court proceeded with a case against a sponsored immigrant in the full knowledge that she is unable to obtain welfare assistance as she cannot be a public charge and in order to lower her support income to considerably beneath the poverty line.   The Attorney General’s office was involved just to ensure that the department of child support has the ability to create deportable offenses against the lowly immigrant who does not have the same rights as US citizens who obtains spousal support when they so helpfully pointed out in  their Respondent’s brief: ” The federal immigration and nationality act forbids admission to the United States of any alien who ‘is likely to become a public charge”.

Justice Richli who has a history of striking down laws as demonstrated here http://www.morongobasinombudsman.com/courts/jurists/betty-ann-richli/presumed-correct.html  repeated verbatim what the Department of child support put in  their brief: ” The federal immigration and nationality act forbids admission to the United States of any alien who ‘is likely to become a public charge’,” in effect recognizing the harmful impact of her opinion.

Justice Richli in her opinion even went one step further and inferred the concept that spousal support should perhaps be attached and should not be considered exempt income for child support cases despite precedent cases, such as In re Marriage of Corman 1997 59 Cal. App. 4Th 1492,  and declined to consider the sponsorship affidavit income as spousal support although numerous precedent cases have cited that this income is considered in lieu of or as spousal support and can only be obtained by a spouse or ex spouse who enforces the affidavit of support.  Love v. Love, 33 A.3d 1268 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) (The Pennsylvania Superior Court Upholds Federal Immigration Law in Spousal Support Matters); Cheshire v. Cheshire, 2006 WL 1208010 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (divorce does not invalidate affidavit of support); Iannuzzelli v. Lovett, 981 So. 2d 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (enforceability of affidavit of support survives divorce); Stump v. Stump, 2005 WL 1290658 (N.D. Ind. 2005) (former wife was entitled to enforce affidavit of support against former husband; wife was not required to receive means-tested benefits as a prerequisite to enforcement); Shumye v. Felleke, 555 F. Supp. 2d 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (divorce does not terminate affidavit of support; affidavit may be enforced by immigrant wife); Younis v. Farooqi, 597 F. Supp. 2d 552 (D. Md. 2009) (divorce is not a condition under which sponsor’s obligations arising from affidavit of support can be terminated); In re Marriage of Sandhu, 207 P.3d 1067 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009).  Justice Richli also somehow invented two contracts when only one exists.

Discrimination does not describe the concept that Justice Richli has created, which affects millions of immigrants who are subject to a mandatory sponsorship affidavit. She has created a concept that is prohibited by Federal law, State law and contract law in order to ensure that the County of San Bernardino could proceed in action to create illegal deportable offenses, when the parent who is collecting welfare is prohibited from doing so under state law.

The ACLU has expressed a possible interest in becoming involved.

Federal Court is considering a Preliminary Injunction in the State of California to prohibit State judges and the relevant appellate courts from upholding unconstitutional vexatious litigant statute.

On the 26th of July the Federal Court in case C 13-01295 JSW took a motion under submission to  issue a preliminary injunction ordering the Defendants (Chief Justice of the Judicial Council and Administrative Director of the AOC) from upholding the vexatious litigant statute as it relates to family law proceedings of the plaintiffs in this case. A copy of the proposed order is viewable below.

Defendants, trial court and appellate courts would be prohibited from requiring filings under the VLS statute and declaring parents vexatious.

The attorney, Arch Cunningham, representing the plaintiffs in this case is directly affected by the vexatious litigant statute himself as a parent, and needless to say this would be an enormous victory for ANY parent facing similar circumstances in the State of California.

Trial courts in California are particularly fond of declaring parents vexatious in family law cases, notably those parents who uncover court corruption and refuse to accept heinous trial court rulings, which violate the legislative intent of the best interest of the child standard.

The minor problem with that little scenario is that it was never the intent of the statute to allow a trial court to put an indefinite stay on trial court proceedings, creating a legal stasis, where the trial court refuses to file the litigation and prevents the litigant from seeking redress through the responsible Court of appeal as no “order is filed”.

A brief analysis of the application in family law demonstrates just how unconstitutional the application really is.

Litigation defined under the vexatious litigant statute is defined under CCP  § 391.a which specifies that “Litigation” means any civil action or proceeding, commenced, maintained or pending in any state or federal court“. The vexatious litigant statute was never intended to be applied to family court proceedings which are dynamic where the best interest of the child standard is the standard that governs proceedings. A trial court may not place an involuntary stay on proceedings, refusing to file litigation and prohibiting that the best interest of the child standard is addressed. The VLS statute itself does not define the merit standard under which litigation in family law proceedings is to be granted nor does it define the time frame, a crucial component in the evolving, fluid and dynamic field of family law.

The merit standard is based on the underlying action upon which the litigation is based. In the case of domestic violence restraining order the merit standard is the domestic violence act under CA family code  § 6200. In the case of contempt of court cases the merit standard is whether the charging affidavit of an order to show cause contained facts setting forth the type of order violated, the date the order was issued, how the order was violated, and when the violation occurred. Jurisdiction to adjudicate a contempt ordinarily exists only if the charging affidavit alleges evidentiary facts showing a prima facie case of contempt, Code of Civil Procedure § 1211(a). Order to show causes that request a modification of custody and visitation need to be addressed according to the legislative standard that defines the best interest of the child standard namely family code § 3020, 3011, 3010, 3004, 3044, 3080 and 3040.

The scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied by the court, i.e., in the `”legal principles governing the subject of [the] action ….”‘” (Nakamura v. Parker (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 327, 337 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 286], citing City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1297 [255 Cal.Rptr. 704] and County of Yolo v. Garcia (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1771, 1778 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 681] [“range of judicial discretion is determined by analogy to the rules contained in the general law and in the specific body or system of law in which the discretionary authority is granted”].) In the case of the VLS statute the underlying merit standard is the action upon which the litigation is based.

The legislature by omission did not intend to apply the VLS statute to family law cases, where the VLS litigation was not defined as a motion that is based upon any of the defining factors that govern the best interest of the child standard, or the domestic violence standard, where time is of the essence and the time frame for filing the litigation is governed by the statute for presenting the applicable filing, pursuant to California rules of court 1.20a. Unless otherwise provided, a document is deemed filed on the date it is received by the court clerk”. NOT one year later when the court feels like it or deliberately violates a parents fourteenth amendment right to due process and equal protection under the law.
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By NewsViews Posted in Law, News

Public invited to express their opinion on CA court of appeal experience.

Once a court ruling has been made where there  was an abuse of discretion, a litigant has the option of appealing that decision. However, most people are not in a position to afford the cost of an appeal or the cost of an attorney to address the appeal for them. The corresponding poll serves as an evaluation of the public experience with the current CA court of appeal.

Voting for more than one category is an option if it mirrors your experience.

Please take some time to express your experience and vote. Feel free to add comments and specific case examples in the comment section.

Call to the public to express their experience with family law mediation.

The public served by the court is invited to voice their experience with mediation services in the Riverside Superior  court and if their appointed child custody recommended counselor complied with the ethics that govern mediation conduct as defined in CA rules of court.  

  http://www.courts.ca.gov/cms/rules/index.cfm?title=five&linkid=rule5_210

Other comments including information on cases is welcomed and can be included in the poll.

Results will be presented to the CA State Auditor and the AOC.